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A large literature on the determinants of poverty finds a strong association with regional and 
country-specific factors like the vulnerability to flooding or tropical diseases, remoteness, 
quality of governance, and property rights (Dollar, Kleineberg and Kraay, 2016). A second 
strand of the literature finds within-country factors such as the availability of infrastructure 
(roads, water, electricity) and services (health, education), proximity to markets, and social 
relationships to matter as much (for example, Kraay and McKenzie, 2014). A third set of 
studies investigate household characteristics such as household size, age structure, 
dependency ratio, gender of the head of household, employment status, hours worked, 
property owned, nutritional status and educational attainment and correlate those to the 
poverty headcount (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). 
 
In this paper we disentangle the link between business regulations and their enforcement and 
the poverty headcount, expanding the evidence on country-level determinants of poverty. In 
particular, we use business regulations on starting a business, acquiring licenses, getting 
credit and contract enforcement, as well as an overall regulatory ranking as indicators of 
property rights. The data are constructed from the World Bank’s Doing Business project and 
cover 189 economies from 2005 to 2013. 
 
We find that business-friendly regulations are correlated with lower poverty headcount, as is 
higher government expenditure, a country’s income per capita, and the regional dummies for 
East Asia and Eastern Europe. We suggest that the conduit for poverty reduction is business 
creation, both as a source of new jobs and as a manifestation of thriving entrepreneurship. 
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Abstract Using panel data for 189 economies from 2005 to 2013, we show that business-friendly 
regulations are correlated with the poverty headcount at the country level. This association is 
significant using the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators on getting credit and contract 
enforcement. We suggest that the conduit for poverty reduction is business creation, both as a 
source of new jobs and as a manifestation of thriving entrepreneurship. 
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A large literature on the determinants of poverty finds a strong association with regional and 
country-specific factors like the vulnerability to flooding or tropical diseases, remoteness, quality 
of governance, and property rights (Dollar, Kleineberg and Kraay, 2016). A second strand of the 
literature finds within-country factors such as the availability of infrastructure (roads, water, 
electricity) and services (health, education), proximity to markets, and social relationships to 
matter as much (for example, Kraay and McKenzie, 2014). A third set of studies investigate 
household characteristics such as household size, age structure, dependency ratio, gender of the 
head of household, employment status, hours worked, property owned, nutritional status and 
educational attainment and correlate those to the poverty headcount (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). 
 
In this paper we disentangle the link between business regulations and their enforcement and the 
poverty headcount, expanding the evidence on country-level determinants of poverty. In 
particular, we use business regulations on starting a business, acquiring licenses, getting credit and 
contract enforcement, as well as an overall regulatory ranking as indicators of property rights. The 
data are constructed from the World Bank’s Doing Business project and cover 189 economies 
from 2005 to 2013. 
 
We find that business-friendly regulations are correlated with lower poverty headcount, as is 
higher government expenditure, a country’s income per capita, and the regional dummies for East 
Asia and Eastern Europe. We suggest that the conduit for poverty reduction is business creation, 
both as a source of new jobs and as a manifestation of thriving entrepreneurship. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources. Section 3 
details the empirical strategy and presents the main results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Data 
 
This section describes the sources of the dependent variables, and the sources and construction of 
independent variables. 
 
The main dependent variable used in previous studies is the poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a 
day (at 2011 purchasing power parity) as a percent of the population. As an alternative variable, 
the poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 a day is sometimes used too. We use both indicators, the 
latter for robustness purposes. The Democratic Republic of Congo is the country with largest 
share of population living below $1.90 a day: 85.56 percent, followed by Madagascar and 
Burundi with 77.88 and 77.65 percent, respectively. Looking at the alternative definition of the 
poverty headcount ratio of $3.10 a day, these percentages increase significantly. The Democratic 
Republic of Congo has nearly its entire population (94.52 percent) living on less than $3.10 a day, 
Burundi – 92.17 percent and Madagascar – 91.08 percent. The correlation between the two 
variables is high, at 93.73 percent. 
 
During the global financial crisis we observe an increase in the poverty headcount in a number of 
low and lower-middle income economies. For example, the average poverty headcount ratio at 
$1.90 in low income countries increases 11 percentage points - from 48.6 percent in 2009 to 60 
percent in 2013. Some middle-income countries, including Croatia, Georgia and Romania in 
Eastern Europe and Honduras and Panama in Central America, experienced a significant increase 
in the poverty headcount. 
 
We use the World Bank’s data on new business formation to investigate the channel through 
which business regulation may affect poverty. These annual data are collected from 143 company 
registrars on the number of newly registered firms. New business entry is defined as the number 
of newly registered corporations per 1,000 working-age people (those ages 15–64). The units of 
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measurement are private, formal sector companies with limited liability. Data extend from 2005 to 
2015. 
 
As proxy for the regulatory attitude of governments we use the World Bank’s Doing Business 
data, first published in 2003. The methodology for data collection is described in Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) and updated in Djankov (2016). We use the Doing 
Business data in two ways. First, we employ the overall score, which combines 10 distinct groups 
of measures that constitute the Doing Business index. These relate to the legal protections and 
regulatory processes that an average private business needs to go through in order to operate 
(Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Second, we use measures in four areas – starting a business, acquiring licenses, getting credit and 
enforcing contracts – as specific measures of business regulation. All measures are positively 
correlated, with the correlation ranging between 0.1810 to 0.7430, with low correlation between 
contract enforcement and acquiring licenses and high correlation between getting credit and the 
total aggregate Doing Business measure. Property registration has the highest correlation with 
contract enforcement (0.4947) and lowest with acquiring licenses (0.2240). All measures are 
negatively correlated with the poverty headcount. GDP per capita is also negatively correlated 
with the poverty headcount, as expected. 
 
Government expenditure is the general government expenditure as a share of GDP, constructed by 
the International Monetary Fund. Among the countries with highest expenditure levels are the 
Pacific Islands states of Kiribati and Marshall Islands, as they receive financial support from 
international institutions and donors. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and France are among the 
biggest spenders globally, with an average expenditure of more than 50% of GDP in the period 
2004-2015. They are also among the countries with highest health and education expenditure. 
Conversely, Bangladesh, the Central African Republic and Nigeria are the countries with least 
government expenditure. We further use government expenditure on education and government 
expenditure on health as more precise measures related to the poverty headcount. 
 
The quality of healthcare is proxied by the mortality rate of adult females (per 1,000 female 
adults), and alternatively by infant mortality. Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe are among the 
countries with the highest mortality rates of adult females, whereas South Korea, Japan, Spain are 
among the countries with the lowest rates. 
 
We next construct a proxy for the change in political power (PolChange). Fifty-four percent of 
countries had parliamentary elections in any one year, consistent with a 4- year election cycle in 
the democratic world. OECD high-income countries had an average of 0.250 elections a year, 
highest in the world. However, Brunei, China, Eritrea, Fiji, Guinea, Qatar, West Bank and Gaza 
and Yemen did not have a single parliamentary election during 2003-2016. Most of these 
countries have presidential or hereditary royal systems. 
 
In testing the effects of political change, we use as our main explanatory variable not just the 
occurrence of elections, but when these elections lead to a change of control over parliament from 
one party or coalition of parties to another. 223 changes of power took place in the sample period. 
 
The data suggest that such change of power varies widely across countries by income group. More 
than sixty percent of political changes during the sample period took place in upper and upper-
middle income countries, while only twelve percent of changes occur in lower income countries. 
Serbia had the highest number of political changes in the sample period (5), Bulgaria, Latvia and 
Slovenia had four changes of power. 
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In extended regressions, we use variables for population growth, the inflation rate, public 
spending on education and on healthcare to test the robustness of our analysis. These data come 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
 
Regional dummies follow the World Bank classification and include East Asia, Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union (post-communist countries), high-income OECD countries, Latin 
America, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. African countries 
constitute 25% of the sample, while OECD high-income countries comprise 18%. The smallest 
region is South Asia, comprising less than 4% of the sample. 
 
 
3. Findings 
 
We begin by controlling for cross-country differences in income levels using GDP per capita, a 
proxy for political change, and year and country fixed-effects. We find that richer countries have 
less incidence of poverty, and that countries that spend more on government services as a share of 
their GDP also display lower poverty headcount. Government expenditure on health and 
education is also negatively correlated with the poverty headcount. These results are consistent 
with the previous literature. When we include health and education expenditures separately, 
education expenditure is negatively correlated with the poverty headcount and this correlation is 
always statistically significant. Health expenditure appears with a negative sign but is only 
sometimes statistically significant (not shown). 
 
The effects of inadequate healthcare, proxied by adult female mortality, on the poverty headcount 
is positive and statistically significant (Table 2). Population growth affects negatively the poverty 
headcount and this association is statistically significant, as in previous studies. The effect of 
political change is insignificant, while inflation is marginally significant (at the 10% level), with a 
negative sign. 
 
[Table 2 here]  
 
Next, we rerun the regression using the overall measure of business regulation and the four 
alternative measures of property rights: the difficulty of starting a business, acquiring licenses, 
getting credit and contract enforcement (Table 3). The choice of indicators is dictated by the 
literature on property rights and their enforcement, which suggests that laws and regulations that 
change the underlying incentives for market participants – firms, workers and investors – are most 
difficult to achieve as they require legislative and sometimes judicial support. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
We find that the general measure of business-friendly regulations, as well as the measures of 
getting credit and enforcing contracts are negatively associated with the poverty headcount. 
However, these associations are statistically significant only in the case of getting credit and 
enforcing contracts. In terms of comparative statics, a 10 percent improvement on enforcing 
contracts indicator results in a 2 percentage points’ reduction in the poverty headcount, a sizable 
effect.  
 
We next investigate the likely conduit for the association between lower poverty and the ease of 
doing business (Table 4). Djankov and others (2002) offer suggestive evidence that the 
relationship goes through increased rates of new business formation in countries with improved 
regulation.  
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We test this hypothesis, using World Bank data on the number of newly created businesses. We 
first demonstrate that business regulation is highly correlated with new business formation, both 
using the overall Doing Business index, as well as the separate measures on starting a business 
and acquiring business licenses (panel A). Second, we show that new business formation is 
negatively related to poverty, though this association is statistically insignificant (panel B). 
Further work is needed to collect data on all formal businesses, not just limited liability 
corporations but also sole proprietorships. Such data may provide a more robust link between 
business regulation and poverty. For now, the conduit from business regulation to poverty through 
new business formation is only suggestive.  
 
[Table 4]  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our results contribute to a burgeoning literature on the country-level determinants of poverty. We 
find empirical support for the association between the poverty headcount and business-friendly 
regulation. Using objective measures in several areas of business regulation, we are able to 
corroborate earlier studies that uses aggregate indicators of property rights and institutional 
development. The likely conduit for this association is through the creation of new businesses that 
generate jobs and economic opportunities for the poor. 
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Table 1 
 
Variable Definition  
Variable Description 
Poverty  Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population).  Source: WDI, 
World Bank. 
Business formation To measure entrepreneurial activity, annual data was collected from 143 company 
registrars on the number of newly registered firms. New business entry is defined as 
the number of newly registered corporations per 1,000 working-age people (those 
ages 15–64). As in the World Bank’s annual Doing Business report, the units of 
measurement are private, formal sector companies with limited liability. Source: 
World Bank's Entrepreneurship Survey and database 
(econ.worldbank.org/research/entrepreneurship). 
Doing Business index Aggregate Doing Business distance to frontier (DTF) score. An economy’s distance 
to frontier is reflected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest 
performance and 100 represents the frontier. Source: Doing Business, 
www.doingbusiness.org 
Starting a Business Starting a Business topic distance to frontier (DTF) score. Source: Doing Business, 
www.doingbusiness.org 
Acquiring Licenses Dealing with Construction Permits topic distance to frontier (DTF) score.  Source: 
Doing Business, www.doingbusiness.org 
Getting Credit Getting Credit topic distance to frontier (DTF) score. Source: Doing Business, 
www.doingbusiness.org 
Enforcing Contracts Enforcing Contracts topic distance to frontier (DTF) score. Source: Doing Business, 
www.doingbusiness.org 
Income per capita One year lag of natural log of GDP per capita (current USD). Source: WDI, World 
Bank  
PolChange Dummy equal to 1 if an alternation of political parties or coalitions took place 12 
months prior to the start of the Doing Business reforms period for the Lower house 
of the country and 0 otherwise. Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and website 
searches 
GovExp General government expenditure (% of GDP). Source: International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017. 
Mortality Mortality rate, adult, female (per 1,000 female adults). Source: WDI, World Bank 
PopGrowth Population growth (annual %). Source: WDI, World Bank 
Inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) Source: WDI, World Bank 
Regions  
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) Dummy indicating a country in East Asia or Pacific region. Source: WDI, World 
Bank 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) Dummy indicating a country in Europe or Central Asia region. Source: WDI, World 
Bank 
OECD high income Dummy indicating a country in OECD high income group. Source: WDI, World 
Bank 
Latin America and Caribbean 
(LAC) 
Dummy indicating a country in Latin America or Caribbean region. Source: WDI, 
World Bank 
Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) 
Dummy indicating a country in Middle East or North Africa region. Source: WDI, 
World Bank 
South Asia (SA) Dummy indicating a country in South Asia region. Source: WDI, World Bank 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Dummy indicating a country in Sub-Saharan Africa region. Source: WDI, World 
Bank 
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Table 2 
Correlates of the Level of Poverty  
Dependent variable: Poverty 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Income per capita -4.732*** -4.363*** -4.440*** -4.452*** -4.431*** 
 
(0.864) (0.869) (0.868) (0.855) (0.854) 
GovExp -0.159*** -0.171*** -0.170*** -0.155*** -0.169*** 
 
(0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0500) (0.0495) (0.0498) 
Mortality 
 
0.0365*** 0.0367*** 0.0404*** 0.0407*** 
  
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
PolChange 
  
-0.318 -0.254 -0.269 
   
(0.453) (0.449) (0.447) 
Population growth 
   
2.613*** 2.656*** 
    
(0.641) (0.640) 
Inflation 
    
-0.0509* 
     
(0.0263) 
2005.year 0.912 0.929 0.907 1.020 0.939 
 
(0.672) (0.671) (0.675) (0.668) (0.667) 
2006.year 0.160 0.306 0.365 0.401 0.339 
 
(0.723) (0.722) (0.726) (0.718) (0.716) 
2007.year 0.328 0.470 0.504 0.557 0.541 
 
(0.772) (0.770) (0.772) (0.763) (0.760) 
2008.year 0.746 0.943 0.986 1.006 1.133 
 
(0.879) (0.876) (0.877) (0.866) (0.866) 
2009.year 0.999 1.284 1.333 1.217 0.994 
 
(0.982) (0.979) (0.980) (0.967) (0.970) 
2010.year 0.677 1.264 1.324 1.415 1.326 
 
(0.907) (0.915) (0.916) (0.904) (0.902) 
2011.year -0.00962 0.515 0.572 0.651 0.697 
 
(0.968) (0.976) (0.977) (0.968) (0.966) 
2012.year 0.673 1.214 1.286 1.272 1.170 
 
(1.061) (1.066) (1.066) (1.051) (1.049) 
2013.year 0.719 1.315 1.384 1.277 1.067 
 
(1.147) (1.153) (1.154) (1.139) (1.140) 
2014.year -0.751 -0.314 -0.247 -0.290 -0.465 
 
(1.211) (1.217) (1.217) (1.201) (1.200) 
      Constant 78.72*** 65.02*** 65.44*** 57.39*** 57.84*** 
 
(5.522) (6.817) (6.807) (7.008) (6.999) 
      Observations 546 539 539 538 538 
Number of cc_num 118 117 117 117 117 
Standard errors in parentheses; regional dummies included but not reported 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 
 
Poverty and Business Regulation 
Dependent variable: Poverty 
 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Income per capita -7.549*** 
-
4.577*** 
-
5.135*** -5.252*** -4.433*** 
 
(1.069) (0.886) (0.992) (0.911) (0.873) 
GovExp -0.150** 
-
0.161*** -0.147** -0.143*** -0.164*** 
 
(0.064) (0.052) (0.059) (0.053) (0.051) 
Mortality 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.056*** 0.027** 0.039*** 
 
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.0108) (0.009) 
Population growth 0.793 2.686*** 2.243*** 2.138*** 2.437*** 
 
(0.703) (0.651) (0.691) (0.660) (0.652) 
Inflation -0.039 -0.062** -0.058** -0.042 -0.064** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) 
Doing Business 
index -0.048 
    
 
(0.070) 
    Starting a Business 
 
-0.010 
   
  
(0.024) 
   Acquiring Licenses 
  
-0.021 
  
   
(0.024) 
  Getting Credit 
   
-0.032* 
 
    
(0.017) 
 Enforcing Contracts 
    
-0.192*** 
     
(0.059) 
2005.year 
 
0.942 
  
1.033 
  
(0.647) 
  
(0.650) 
2006.year 
 
0.400 
 
0.760 0.507 
  
(0.702) 
 
(0.691) (0.700) 
2007.year 
 
0.648 0.0512 1.196 0.731 
  
(0.756) (0.674) (0.750) (0.748) 
2008.year 1.254** 1.332 1.034 1.858** 1.357 
 
(0.624) (0.882) (0.786) (0.871) (0.854) 
2009.year 1.963*** 1.114 0.930 2.090** 1.088 
 
(0.743) (0.996) (0.897) (1.007) (0.963) 
2010.year 1.598** 1.494 1.097 2.172** 1.489* 
 
(0.698) (0.937) (0.818) (0.936) (0.891) 
2011.year 1.644** 0.899 0.811 1.772* 0.712 
 
(0.749) (1.010) (0.898) (1.009) (0.961) 
2012.year 2.849*** 1.438 1.676* 2.377** 1.272 
 
(0.848) (1.095) (0.994) (1.099) (1.047) 
2013.year 2.915*** 1.373 1.592 2.360** 1.111 
 
(0.963) (1.188) (1.089) (1.189) (1.140) 
      Constant 85.89*** 60.08*** 59.61*** 69.48*** 68.08*** 
 
(9.278) (7.120) (8.173) (7.417) (7.303) 
      Observations 353 508 407 454 508 
Number of cc_num 109 117 113 114 117 
Standard errors in parentheses; regional dummies included but not reported 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4a 
 
New Business Formation and Business Regulation 
Dependent variable: Business Formation 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Income per capita 1.106*** 0.999*** 1.146*** 1.210*** 1.119*** 
 
(0.303) (0.229) (0.255) (0.248) (0.231) 
Inflation 0.00833 0.00781 0.00766 0.00921 0.00806 
 
(0.00728) (0.00641) (0.00712) (0.00672) (0.00644) 
Doing Business index 0.0839*** 
    
 
(0.0234) 
    Starting a Business 
 
0.0237*** 
   
  
(0.00729) 
   Acquiring Licenses 
  
0.0329*** 
  
   
(0.00833) 
  Getting Credit 
   
0.00490 
 
    
(0.00568) 
 Enforcing Contracts 
    
0.00522 
     
(0.0165) 
2005.year 
 
0.0977 
  
0.122 
  
(0.179) 
  
(0.180) 
2006.year 
 
0.266 
 
0.264 0.298 
  
(0.183) 
 
(0.187) (0.183) 
2007.year 
 
0.378** 0.276 0.391** 0.439** 
  
(0.193) (0.176) (0.197) (0.193) 
2008.year -0.534*** -0.103 -0.210 -0.0674 0.00903 
 
(0.163) (0.213) (0.195) (0.219) (0.212) 
2009.year -1.012*** -0.502** -0.639*** -0.444* -0.346 
 
(0.178) (0.232) (0.214) (0.237) (0.229) 
2010.year -0.912*** -0.365 -0.483** -0.284 -0.189 
 
(0.180) (0.226) (0.207) (0.230) (0.222) 
2011.year -0.943*** -0.352 -0.463** -0.258 -0.144 
 
(0.194) (0.243) (0.223) (0.247) (0.237) 
2012.year -1.075*** -0.437* -0.576** -0.346 -0.218 
 
(0.211) (0.260) (0.242) (0.265) (0.255) 
2013.year -1.212** -0.580 -0.508 -0.478 -0.319 
 
(0.591) (0.608) (0.602) (0.623) (0.606) 
Constant -9.408*** -6.599*** -7.812*** -6.820*** -6.333*** 
 
(2.029) (1.610) (1.816) (1.706) (1.709) 
      Observations 676 977 775 878 977 
Number of cc_num 130 130 130 130 130 
Standard errors in parentheses; regional dummies included but not reported 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4b 
 
Poverty and New Business Formation 
Dependent variable: Poverty  
 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Business 
Formation -0.0319 -0.0751 -0.0806 -0.0912 -0.0756 -0.0704 
 
(0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.108) 
Income per 
capita 
 
-4.048*** -3.800*** -3.585*** -3.547*** -3.591*** 
  
(0.875) (0.896) (0.902) (0.892) (0.884) 
GovExp 
  
-0.0561 -0.0719 -0.0451 -0.0829 
   
(0.0556) (0.0561) (0.0559) (0.0573) 
Mortality 
   
0.0287** 0.0311*** 0.0321*** 
    
(0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0111) 
Population 
growth 
    
2.116*** 2.111*** 
     
(0.628) (0.623) 
Inflation 
     
-0.0647*** 
      
(0.0248) 
2005.year 0.202 0.961 0.980 0.995 1.054* 0.965 
 
(0.601) (0.631) (0.635) (0.637) (0.627) (0.624) 
2006.year -0.940 0.496 0.487 0.568 0.559 0.560 
 
(0.592) (0.675) (0.677) (0.679) (0.669) (0.664) 
2007.year -1.668*** 0.263 0.257 0.406 0.351 0.414 
 
(0.602) (0.737) (0.739) (0.741) (0.730) (0.725) 
2008.year -2.312*** 0.525 0.538 0.731 0.654 0.901 
 
(0.604) (0.865) (0.866) (0.868) (0.856) (0.853) 
2009.year -2.874*** 0.615 0.693 0.995 0.706 0.607 
 
(0.577) (0.962) (0.969) (0.972) (0.961) (0.954) 
2010.year -2.416*** 0.659 0.715 1.168 1.024 1.020 
 
(0.612) (0.905) (0.909) (0.923) (0.910) (0.903) 
2011.year -3.248*** 0.245 0.229 0.644 0.480 0.733 
 
(0.606) (0.970) (0.971) (0.986) (0.980) (0.976) 
2012.year -2.871*** 1.227 1.176 1.663 1.462 1.505 
 
(0.602) (1.066) (1.067) (1.081) (1.067) (1.058) 
2014.year -4.814*** -0.328 -0.350 0.124 -0.296 -0.237 
 
(0.842) (1.300) (1.302) (1.310) (1.296) (1.286) 
Constant 45.92*** 72.01*** 71.80*** 61.42*** 54.70*** 56.15*** 
 
(2.767) (5.758) (5.830) (7.240) (7.400) (7.352) 
       Observations 371 368 367 362 361 361 
Number of 
cc_num 83 82 82 81 81 81 
Standard errors in parentheses; regional dummies included but not reported 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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